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Abstract 
 
We use a SVAR approach to the effects of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as their 
interactions (policy mix) for the US and the Euro Area (EMU). Overall, our results show that 
these two cases are different from each other. First, while in the case of the US there is evidence 
of Keynesian monetary policy, the same is not true in the case of the EMU. Second, considering 
the effects of the global economic and financial crisis, there is evidence of non-Keynesian fiscal 
policy in the case of the EMU (expansionary fiscal consolidation), while it does not hold in the 
case of the US. Third, there is evidence supporting the traditional inverse relationship between 
monetary policy interest rates and inflation in the case of the US, whereas in the case of the 
EMU there is a price puzzle (frequent in SVAR studies). Fourth, the baseline model seems to 
be robust in the case of the US, when considering the effects of the economic and financial 
crisis 2007-2009, while the opposite holds in the case of the EMU. However, in both cases, the 
policies seem to act as complements. Another similarity appears when analysing the 
relationship between public spending and taxation, where there is evidence supporting a fiscal 
retrenchment. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, there is a consensus in favour of the separation of powers of monetary and 
fiscal policies to achieve the main objective of economic policy, i.e., a sustained non-
inflationary growth or at least both policies should be used to stabilise the economy (Sprinkel, 
1963). 
      The topic of fiscal and monetary interactions has gained renewed importance in the last 
years because of the effects of the 2007-2009 economic and financial crisis: regarding monetary 
policy, central banks lowered aggressively their policy interest rates, although their ability to 
do so became constrained at the ELB (Effective Lower Bound); regarding fiscal policy, 
governments launched expansionary packages to recover the sharp decline in output verified 
during this period, as well as the large increase in unemployment. The result was the following: 
the central banks could not lower further their policy rates and the governments saw their levels 
of deficits and debts rise to historic levels, which led to a new discussion related to 
unconventional monetary policies and fiscal consolidation. 
      In this paper, we develop an empirical study using the SVAR approach (Sims, 1980) to 
analyse the policy mix in the Euro Area (EMU) and in the US. One limitation is inherent to the 
data for the Euro Area, as it masks important heterogeneity across countries, namely relative to 
those where the crisis had a significantly higher impact. Nevertheless, the SVAR is a widely 
used methodology to analyse the transmission of macroeconomic policies to macroeconomic 
variables in several studies, as it provides useful tools such as impulse response functions to 
analyse the response of each variable in the model to another along time. Then, our main 
objective in this work is to perform an analysis of the effects of fiscal policy and monetary 
policy, as well as their interactions, and we also provide a short analysis of the causality between 
public spending and taxation through applying a SVAR model.  
Our results show that in the case of the US there is evidence of Keynesian monetary policy, 
the same is not true in the case of the EMU. Moreover, there is evidence of the traditional 
inverse relationship between monetary policy interest rates and inflation in the case of the US, 
whereas in the case of the EMU there is a price puzzle (frequent in SVAR studies). 
       In section 2, we present the relevant literature review for our topic. In section 3, we analyse 
the data and underline important patterns of it during the critical periods (2007-09 and 2010-
12), to anticipate important relations for future policy, the econometric framework used in our 
study, as well as the empirical analysis of our results. In section 4, we perform a robustness 
check by assessing how the model works with alternative variables. Finally, section 5 
concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) were the pioneers in this study of the policy mix. Indeed, they 
conclude that if the fiscal authority sets its budgets independently from the monetary authority, 
then the latter might be forced to tolerate a higher inflation rate than it would prefer to generate 
sufficient revenue from seigniorage to satisfy the government budget constraint: 
𝑏 = 𝑏 + 𝑔 − 𝜌 − − 𝑧                                   (1) 
where 𝑏  is the debt ratio, 𝑟  is the real interest rate, 𝑦   is the real GDP growth,  𝑔  is the primary 
government spending (%of GDP), 𝜌  is the government revenue (% of GDP), 𝑀  is the nominal 
monetary base, 𝑃  is the price level,  𝑌  is the real GDP, and 𝑧  represents the possibility of the 
government selling assets, i.e., privatizations (% of GDP).  
      Rossi and Zubairy (2011) resume that separately considering either monetary policy or 
fiscal policy is a literature lack, which we think it was only committed in the past. Indeed, their 
findings are provided in form of new stylised facts: (i) fiscal and monetary policy shocks have 
different effects on macroeconomic fluctuations, depending on their frequencies and (ii) failing 
to consider fiscal and monetary variables simultaneously leads researchers to incorrectly 
attribute economic fluctuations to the wrong source. 
      Apart from the ‘pioneers’ mentioned above, there are other theories related to the subject 
of policy mix (see Walsh, 2010). The most remarkable theories are: (i) the Fiscal Theory of the 
Price Level (FTPL), (ii) strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary policies, and (iii) 
empirical studies. 
      The FTPL was initially developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994, 
1995). The idea is that the price level is determined via the intertemporal government budget 
constraint in such a way that the price level adjusts to ensure that the current real value of the 
outstanding government debt equals the present real value of future government primary 
balances. Given that, this is a less orthodox view relative to Sargent and Wallace (1981) because 
in the latter the price level is still a monetary result. The major difference between these two 
relies on the possibility of non-Ricardian regimes, which would be a favourable aspect to 
validate the FTPL. Several discussions and empirical assessments were conducted (McCallum, 
2001; Buiter, 2002; Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba 1996, 2001; Cochrane, 2001; Afonso, 2008). 
Although each case has its own characteristics, overall the evidence points in favour of 
Ricardian regimes, i.e., invalidation of the FTPL. 
      The theory about strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary policies is centred on 
game theory. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) show that it is reached a type of non-cooperative 
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equilibrium which results in values for GDP and inflation very different from the ones desired 
due to divergent objectives of the two authorities. Similar conclusions were found by Buti et al. 
(2001). 
    Empirical studies focus on the relation of complementarity/substitutability between the two 
policies. Mélitz (2000) show that coordinated macroeconomic policy exists, i.e., the two 
policies tend to move in opposite directions, thus being strategic substituents, as well as 
Wyplosz (1999) and von Hagen et al. (2001). Sometimes, and as we will do in this paper, the 
authors settle a comparison between the US and the Euro Area, two of the major economies 
worldwide. For example, van Aarle et al. (2003) shows that in a SVAR model to analyse the 
transmission of monetary and fiscal policy in the EMU, the Euro-Area estimated adjustments 
to the various structural shocks are found comparable to the case of US. Peersman and Smets 
(2001) also show the similarity between the US and the Euro Area, although the data used took 
the range from 1980 to 1998, i.e., this period does not consider the period in which neither the 
Stability and Growth Pact nor the single monetary policy had influence. Apart from that, this 
work is also important in such a way that it analyses the impact of monetary policy on other 
macroeconomic variables, such as labour market variables, asset prices, investment, and private 
consumption. 
       Even though it is not the central idea of this paper, another issue we can analyse is the 
interdependency between government spending and revenues. It is particularly important due 
to the recent years of unsustainable public finances worldwide, although it cannot be only 
attributable to this relationship between government spending and revenues. There are two 
views on this subject: (i) “tax and spend” and (ii) “spend and tax”. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
use a fiscal SVAR model to analyse both types of causality between government spending and 
taxation, and one can find the positive relationship between government spending and taxes, 
although the latter increase less than the former which may indicate unsustainable public 
finances. 
    There is a question about the significance of the policy effect on the business cycle, even 
though there is some consensus on transmission mechanisms. Korenok and Radchenko (2004) 
resume that monetary policy shocks do not play an important role in cyclical fluctuations, where 
these shocks are known as monetary policy interest rate shocks. Additionally, during the 2007-
09 crisis, the sovereigns relied heavily on fiscal policy due to the limited room for manoeuvre 
for monetary policy in the presence of the zero-lower bound (ZLB) for nominal interest rates 
(Blanchard et al., 2010). 
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      As we mentioned above, the topic of the policy mix gained renewed importance in the recent 
years because of the crisis, namely when the governments have seen themselves with limited 
room for manoeuvre because the substantial increase on the deficit and debt ratios caused by 
the fiscal stimuli launched during the ZLB period. Therefore, both fiscal and monetary policies 
were limited to correct the economic fluctuation caused by the crisis. Indeed, Alcidi and Thirion 
(2016) present an overview of the policy mix before and after the crisis in the EMU, US and 
UK. During the period 2000-15, the policy mix appears to be to some extent different in the 
EMU relative to the US. In terms of monetary policy, the inverse relationship between interest 
rates and inflation is weaker over the period after the crisis and less reliable since the interest 
rate is not a good proxy for monetary policy. In terms of fiscal policy, the EMU reacted in a 
more conservative way to the crisis due to three factors: fiscal rules, sovereign crisis (which 
resulted in a loss of access to the credit market because of the imposed market discipline) and 
fiscal cost of supporting financial institutions. They conclude with future challenges for 
policymakers, namely the need to consider financial stability in the definition of the policy mix. 
      Blanchard et al. (2013) provided new ways of acting for policymakers. In terms of monetary 
policy, the central banks should start targeting economic activity and financial stability, as well 
as to perform forward guidance and to avoid providing liquidity to nonbanks, given that the 
limited information possessed by central banks could lead to a liquidity crisis. In terms of fiscal 
policy, there should be a more comprehensive approach to measure public debt and lower 
thresholds for the debt ratio. Another important aspect is the risk of fiscal dominance caused by 
the need for difficult fiscal adjustment because the government would put pressure on the 
central banks to help limit borrowing costs, which in turn would jeopardise the central banks’ 
independence, as well as raise an issue on the risks of fiscal activism for inflation volatility (see 
Afonso and Jalles, 2017). In the end, they also analyse macroprudential instruments as guides 
for future policy, which we leave for future research due to the limited space in a unique paper. 
      In terms of unconventional monetary policies (UMP), Kozicki et al. (2011) provide an 
important survey of the types of central bank asset purchases, evidence on these purchases, 
difficulties to decide when exiting from UMP and potential costs of it. Overall, the measures of 
quantitative easing (QE) were positive for the macroeconomic environment (see for example 
Baumeister and Benati, 2010; Chung et al., 2011; Afonso and Kazemi, 2018). However, UMP 
are only effective under specific circumstances, such as when targeted to address a specific 
market failure and enhanced by clear communication. Moreover, there is a trade-off in exiting 
from UMP since an overly aggressive exit, namely in the face of fiscal retrenchment, would 
eventually push back economies into recession, while an excessively delayed exit would lead 
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to excessive liquidity in the economy, as well as bring inflationary pressures. Finally, UMP also 
bring potential costs, such as financial market distortions, potential loss of central banks’ 
independence and credibility, and not less important a delay of necessary macroeconomic 
adjustments. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data and Analysis 
      We use quarterly data from 1990:1 to 2016:4 for the US and from 1995:1 to 2016:4 for the 
EMU (tables I.A and I.B specify the data sources, definitions and transformations for the US 
and for the EMU, respectively).  
[Table I.A] 
[Table I.B] 
Although we argue that each case has its own properties and there is an important difference 
between these economies (the US is a market-based economy and the EMU is a bank-based 
economy), we conduct this study to compare the policy mix between the two economies and to 
see how the policy mix has changed due to the financial crisis and sovereign crisis (EMU), if 
any. 
      The variables of our interest for this paper were the output gap/output growth, the capb 
(cyclically adjusted primary balance), the debt ratio, a proxy for the policy interest rate (EONIA 
for the EMU and the Federal Funds Rate for the US), inflation and assets held by the central 
bank. We also collected data on government spending and tax revenues, to analyse how these 
two parts of the budget balance react and to check the causality between them, and on a financial 
stress indicator (CISS, Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress, for the EMU and the FSI, 
Financial Stress Index, for the US). 
      In Figure 1, we present the relevant figures for the US. Relative to the annual real GDP 
growth, there is a sharp decrease from 2007: Q3 to 2009: Q2, where the latter represents the 
turning point of the subprime crisis (the growth rate was approximately -4.1%). The recovery 
afterwards lasted until 2010: Q3, when the annual growth rate attained 3%. Then, there is a 
stabilised growth rate until the end of 2016, where it was always positive. In terms of annual 
inflation, it rarely was in the objective “close to 2%”. The more relevant volatility is related to 
the subprime crisis, where the annual inflation rate ranged from 5.1% in 2008: Q3 to -1.6% in 
2009: Q3. Relative to monetary policy, analysing the graph which combines the FFR (Federal 
Funds Rate) and the output gap, we can see the aggressive cut in the FFR from 5.3% in 2007: 
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Q3 to 0.1% in 2009: Q4. In fact, both the output gap and the annual real GDP growth rate did 
not recover as expected by the interest rate mechanism of traditional monetary policy.  
[Figure 1] 
Furthermore, the output gap started to recover in 2009: Q3, as well as the annual real GDP and 
so other factors may be related to both recoveries since the FFR persisted close to its ZLB. In 
terms of fiscal policy, there is an aggressive cut in the capb (expansionary fiscal policy) from 
2007: Q1 to 2010: Q3 that did not have the expected result in both output gap and real GDP 
growth, followed by a strong fiscal consolidation afterwards until the end of the sample. By 
looking at the behaviour of the capb during the whole sample one could say that the Keynesian 
effects of fiscal policy were outweighed by non-Keynesian ones. However, there is still a 
discussion about the measures of discretionary fiscal policy through the capb, but this is a 
discussion outside from our plan in this paper. Analysing specifically some parts of the budget 
balance, such as the real values of public spending and taxes, we can see that the latter is always 
below the former and this relationship aggravates during the 2007-09 crisis (it is still persistent 
afterwards) which may also indicate non-discretionary adjustments of these variables, i.e., 
during that crisis there were simultaneous increases in public spending and decreases in taxes 
due to higher unemployment (higher unemployment subsidies and lower tax revenues on 
personal income). Not surprisingly, the debt-to-GDP ratio substantially increases from 64% in 
2008: Q2 to 102% in 2013: Q1 which reflects in part the behaviour of subsequent deficits. 
Relative to the policy mix, one could argue that overall fiscal and monetary policies act as 
complements, i.e., they tend to move in the same direction. During the 2007-2010 period, we 
can observe both expansionary fiscal and monetary policies which have not resulted in 
economic growth. Finally, we present the factors we consider to be determinant for the recovery 
of real GDP annual growth rate and, therefore inflation: unconventional monetary policy (e.g. 
quantitative easing, QE) and a sustained decrease of above-average financial market stress 
(measured by the FSI). The graph of total assets of all Federal Reserve banks show the 
successive QE measures in the US: 2008: Q3-2010: Q1 (QE1), 2010: Q4-2011: Q3 (QE2) and 
2012: Q3-2014: Q4 (QE3). In its turn, the FSI attained the maximum level of 4.25 in 2008: Q4 
and then it decreased to negative values, where it stays until today, representing below-average 
financial market stress. 
      In Figure 2, we present the relative figures for the EMU. Relative to annual real GDP 
growth, there was a sharp decrease from 3.8% in 2007: Q2 to -4.3% in 2009: Q2. Then, there 
was a significant recovery until 2010: Q4 when the growth rate attained 1.7%. However, there 
were some countries that began a new recession in this period, namely Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
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Greece and Spain which contributed to a significant decrease of the annual real GDP growth 
rate to -2.3% in 2012: Q3. Aftermath, there was a recovery and this growth rate started to be 
positive in 2013: Q4, and it stayed to be until nowadays. In terms of inflation, we can see that 
its volatility started with the 2007-09 crisis, as before it was above but “close to 2%”. Indeed, 
there are two periods in which the annual inflation rate decreased a lot: (i) during the “subprime 
crisis” it decreased from 3.8% in 2008: Q3 to -0.4% in 2009: Q3 and (ii) during the “sovereign 
crisis” it decreased from 2.9% in 2011: Q4 to -0.3% in 2015: Q1.  
[Figure 2] 
Relative to monetary policy, one could say that the traditional monetary transmission 
mechanism started to change in the 2000s, as the EONIA and the output gap started to move in 
the same direction, while it should move in the opposite. Again, we can see the ECB cutting 
one of its policy rates from 4.3% in 2008: Q3 to 0.4% in 2009: Q4 to stimulate the economy, 
but ending in the ZLB without having a significant effect on both the output gap and the real 
GDP growth rate. Interestingly, from 2015: Q1 to the end of the sample period the EONIA is 
negative, which reflected a new case study for the Euro Area: the possibility to overcome the 
ZLB with negative interest rates. Relative to fiscal policy, we can see also the behaviour related 
before: there was a significant expansionary fiscal policy during the 2007-09 period without 
influencing both the output gap and the real GDP growth rate. Again, as in the US case, one 
could say that the Keynesian effects were not valid during this sample because the output gap 
seems to move in the same direction of the capb, but again the discussion of the measures of 
discretionary fiscal policy is outside from the plan of this paper. As in the US, the level of real 
taxes was always below the level of real public spending and this relationship also aggravates 
from 2008 afterwards. However, it was not as grave as in the US which can be explained by the 
rules presented in the Stability and Growth Pact effective in the EMU. Again, not surprisingly 
the debt ratio started to increase from 65.84% in 2008: Q1 to 93.07% in 2014: Q2. The more 
severe aggravation in the US may be in part explained by a higher fiscal stimulus launched in 
that area than in the EMU, as well as the fiscal retrenchment lived in the EMU during and after 
the sovereign crisis, usually dated from 2010 to nowadays. For curiosity, it is interesting that 
the debt-to-GDP ratio computed for the Euro Area was never below or at the threshold of 60% 
present in the Stability Growth Pact and recently shown as the “prudent debt level” (Andrés et 
al., 2017). Relative to the policy mix, one could argue that fiscal and monetary policy act as 
complements, as observed in the case of the US, except for the 1995-1999 which could reflect 
a change in the paradigm of the policy mix with the creation of the single monetary union. The 
same pattern observed in the US is observed in this case, as we see in 2009 both monetary and 
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fiscal policies being without room for manoeuvre. Although there is no such reference value 
for the CISS as in the case of the FSI for the US, it shows substantial increases during the 2007-
2009 period, as well as during the 2010-2011/12 period reflecting both the effects of the global 
economic and financial crisis and the (Greek) sovereign crisis with its contagion across the 
EMU countries. Finally, the ECB assets graph represents a proxy for the unconventional 
monetary policies carried out in the EMU. The most relevant changes were from 2011: Q2 to 
2012: Q3 and from 2015: Q1 to 2016: Q4, where the latter corresponds to the introduction of 
QE in the EMU which occurred much later than in the US (see Driffill (2015) for a discussion). 
 
3.2. Econometric Framework 
      Macroeconomic phenomena are characterised by feedback and reciprocal causality, and so 
we analyse the effects of fiscal policy and monetary policy, as well as their interaction, and 
provide a short analysis of the causality between public spending and taxation through applying 
a structural VAR (SVAR) model. 
      Introduced by Sims (1980), VAR models have been widely used in analysing monetary and 
fiscal shocks, both integrated and separated, and their effect on the real economy. In its turn, 
the SVAR approach was pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989), concentrating on long-run 
identifying restrictions to identify demand and supply shocks hitting the economy. Monticelli 
and Tristani (1999) use a SVAR approach to analyse the transmission mechanism of aggregate 
demand shocks, aggregate supply shocks and monetary policy shocks in the aggregate EMU. 
SVAR models require a minimum set of restrictions and offer useful instruments, such as 
impulse response functions (see van Aarle et al. (2003) for an overview of advantages and 
limitations of this methodology). Other useful instruments, such as the Granger causality tests 
and forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) will not be considered throughout this paper. 
      In this paper, we include both monetary and fiscal variables, as Favero (2002) has shown 
that a separate estimation of monetary and fiscal policies effects would lead to biased 
estimators, hence reinforcing the importance to study the policy mix, instead of separated 
macroeconomic policies effect. 
      Now, we describe a benchmark SVAR model to analyse the topics described above: 
𝐴𝑌 = 𝐺(𝐿)𝑌 + 𝐶(𝐿)𝑋 + 𝐵𝑣                                (2) 
Where A represents a (𝑛𝑥𝑛) matrix of long-run relations, 𝑌  represents a (𝑛𝑥1) vector of 
endogenous macroeconomic variables, 𝐺(𝐿) and 𝐶(𝐿) represent lag operators, 𝐵 represents a 
diagonal matrix, 𝑋  represents a (𝑛𝑥1) vector of exogenous variables and 𝑣  represents the 
(𝑛𝑥1) structural innovations vector. 
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      Equation (2) presents the structural model of the economy, which cannot be empirically 
observed. On the other hand, by solving that equation to 𝑌  we get the reduced-form model, 
whose shocks 𝜇 = 𝐴 𝐵𝑣  can be observed. Here, the identification problem emerges, which 
we will turn later. 
      We use two different sets of endogenous variables in this benchmark model. The first one 
is 𝑌 = (𝑦 , 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 , 𝑖 , 𝜋 )  and the second is 𝑌 = (𝑦 , 𝑡 , 𝑔 , 𝑖 , 𝜋 )′, where 𝑦 represents the real 
GDP, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 is the cyclically adjusted primary balance, 𝑖 is the proxy for the monetary policy 
rate (the Fed funds rate for the US and the EONIA for the EMU), 𝑡 represents the real tax 
revenues, 𝑔 represents the real total government spending and 𝜋 represents the inflation rate. 
In the case of 𝑋 , in the benchmark models it is defined as 𝑋 = (𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) and in the alternative 
model it is defined as 𝑋 = (𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ), where 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 represents the assets held by each 
central bank and 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 represents a dummy variable to isolate the effect of the crisis, which 
assumes the value of 1 from 2008:Q4 until the end of the sample. In table 2 we present the 
specifications formally. 
[Table II] 
      All in all, we estimate 4 models for the US and the EMU. The reasonable comparisons are 
between model 1 and model 3, as well as between model 2 and model 4, in terms of analysing 
the effect of introducing the dummy variable in the model. The difference between models 1 
and 2, as well as between 3 and 4, is that in the odd we consider the capb and in the even we 
consider both the revenue and spending parts of the budget balance. Naturally, it is also 
reasonable to settle a comparison between the two cases of US and EMU. 
 
3.3. Empirical Analysis 
      In this section, we analyse the results of our benchmark models. For simplicity, we will 
analyse separately the economies and then we make a comparison between the two. 
 
3.3.1. The case of US 
    Before running the model, it is adequate to check whether all series included in the model 
are stationary. Table 3 provides the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for each 
variable. Indeed, the tests indicate that the series are non-stationary (except inflation) and these 
have different orders of integration (GDP, policy rate, capb and assets are I(1), while public 
spending is I(2)). For this reason, we decide to implement the following vectors of endogenous 
and exogenous variables respectively 𝑌 = (∆𝑦 , ∆𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 , ∆𝑖 , 𝜋 ) and 𝑋 = (∆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ), where 
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∆𝑦  is the real GDP growth, ∆𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏  is the change in the capb, ∆𝑖  is the change in the Federal 
funds rate, 𝜋  is the inflation rate and ∆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  is the change in the assets held by all the Federal 
Reserve banks.  
[Table III] 
    Therefore, this model is driven by four structural shocks: an aggregate supply shock, 𝑣 , a 
fiscal shock, 𝑣 , a monetary shock, 𝑣 , and an aggregate demand shock, 𝑣 . In the second 
specification, the model is driven by five structural shocks: an aggregate supply shock, 𝑣 , a 
real government taxes shock, 𝑣 , a real government spending shock, 𝑣 , a monetary shock, 𝑣 , 
and an aggregate demand shock, 𝑣 .  
      Relative to the identification problem, it is in practice solved by imposing identifying 
restrictions. As we are simulating a structural VAR and economic theory provides more 
guidance about long-run relationships rather than short-run dynamics, we impose long-run 
identification restrictions as in Blanchard and Quah (1989). Moreover, we have macroeconomic 
theories to impose this kind of restrictions, such as the AS-AD model. In practice, we need to 
identify 6 restrictions for the 1st specification and 10 restrictions for the 2nd one (we will follow 
van Aarle et al. (2003) for the 2nd specification of the benchmark model). 
      Thus, in the 1st specification we apply the following restrictions: (i) fiscal shocks do not 
have a permanent effect on real output, because of the long-run neutrality of fiscal policy 
supported by Ricardian equivalence; (ii) monetary shocks do not have a permanent effect on 
real output, because of the long-run neutrality of money (McCandless and Weber, 1995; 
Christiano et al., 1999).; (iii) aggregate demand shocks do not have a permanent effect on real 
output (Blanchard and Quah, 1989); (iv) monetary shocks do not have a permanent effect on 
fiscal policy, because of the possibility of the fiscal authority setting its budgets independently 
from the monetary authority (Sargent and Wallace, 1981); (v) aggregate demand shocks do not 
have a permanent effect on fiscal policy, because of the smallness and temporariness of fiscal 
policy shocks (Friedman, 1972), the fiscal authority will not react to aggregate demand shocks 
in the long run; (vi) aggregate demand shocks do not have a permanent effect on monetary 
policy because of the non-clarity of the effects of the former on the latter as Barro (1987) 
highlighted the inconsistency between theory and data, and namely the empirical evidence to 
the US supports this idea (Murphy and Walsh, 2015). 
      Then, in the 2nd specification (van Aarle et al., 2003): (i) real government taxes shocks do 
not have a permanent effect on real output; (ii) real government spending shocks do not have a 
permanent effect on real output; (iii) real government spending shocks do not have a permanent 
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effect on real government taxes; (iv) monetary shocks do not have a permanent effect on real 
output; (v) monetary shocks do not have a permanent effect on real government taxes; (vi) 
monetary shocks do not have a permanent effect on real government spending; (vii) aggregate 
demand shocks do not have a permanent effect on real output; (viii) aggregate demand shocks 
do not have a permanent effect on real government taxes; (ix) aggregate demand shocks do not 
have a permanent effect on real government spending; (x) aggregate demand shocks do not 
have a permanent effect on the monetary policy interest rate. 
      We have run a model up to 2 lags in both specifications. From the reduced-form model, we 
could conclude that the model satisfies the hypotheses of homoscedasticity and absence of 
autocorrelation, and the model is also stable (the inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial 
lie inside the unit circle). Relative to normality, this hypothesis was relatively rejected, but this 
is an expected result because the number of observations is not high enough to satisfy this 
property, and so the test has low power. 
      Then, impulse response functions can be calculated from the estimated SVAR models 
(structural decomposition of innovations), which show the effects of the shocks we are 
interested in analysing. The accumulated effects on growth rates reflect the effects on the level 
of the endogenous variables, in each period. Quantitatively, a response of 0.01 corresponds to 
a 1% change in the variable of interest (𝑦, 𝑡, 𝑔, 𝜋), while the same 0.01 corresponds to a 1 p.p. 
change in the others (𝑖, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏). Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions to fiscal 
and monetary shocks in model 1, for the US. At the same time, figures 5 and 6 show the impulse 
response functions to taxes and monetary shocks in model 2, for the US12. For reasons of 
statistical significance, we neglected the analysis of spending shocks in the two figures of both 
models 2 and 4 in both cases of the US and EMU. Nevertheless, it is available on request. 
      Model 1: (i) supply shocks (results on request) result in an increase in real output; in terms 
of policy, both the fiscal and monetary authorities conduct restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies to cool the economic growth, where latter is statistically significant until the 7th quarter; 
(ii) demand shocks (results on request) result in an increase in inflation; in terms of policy, both 
fiscal and monetary policies became restrictive to cool the economic growth and sustain 
inflationary pressures, although the government reaction is statistically significant until 3 
quarters from now whereas the Fed reaction is statistically significant during 1 quarter; (iii) 
                                                          
1 The IRFs of AS and AD shocks, as well as the IRFs of models 3 and 4 are available on request. In the case of 
the EMU, we will perform in the same way. 
2 Below the figures, we identify the shocks (EViews does not do it when using accumulated IRFs). We did the 
same for the EMU figures. 
 
13 
 
fiscal policy shocks show Keynesian effects, i.e., a restrictive fiscal policy results in a lower 
real output (statistically significant during 3 quarters); 
[Figure 3] 
 (iv) monetary policy shocks show the traditional interest rate mechanism, i.e., an increase in 
the FFR results in a decrease of real output, even though these results are not statistically 
significant; (v) relative to the fiscal and monetary interactions, the capb hardly reacts to the 
FFR, while the FFR seems to act as a complement to the capb, i.e., both fiscal and monetary 
policies seem to move in the same direction, even though the result is not statistically 
significant; nevertheless, the complementary reaction of these capb and FFR to aggregate 
supply shocks may lead us to conclude that the policies are working as complements.  
[Figure 4] 
      Model 2: (i) supply shocks (results on request) result in an increase on real output and in a 
decrease on inflation, although the latter is not significant and disappears after 6 quarters; in 
terms of policy, both fiscal and monetary policies become restrictive (increase on FFR, increase 
on taxation and decrease on public spending, although the latter is not statistically significant), 
wherein the case of fiscal policy it is taxation changing more relatively to spending; (ii) demand 
shocks (results on request) result in an increase on real output and an increase on inflation, 
although the former is not significant; (iii) fiscal policy shocks show Keynesian effects both on 
the revenue and spending sides, i.e., an increase on taxation is followed by a decrease on real 
output (statistically significant during 2 quarters) and an increase on public spending is followed 
by an increase on real output (not statistically significant);  
[Figure 5] 
(iv) monetary policy shocks remain unchanged from the perspective of model 1, i.e., an interest 
rate hike results in a decrease on real output, as well as in a decrease on inflation, although these 
results are not statistically significant; (v) in terms of fiscal and monetary interactions, the 
results are more significant in the sense of complementarity, i.e., increases in FFR result in 
decreases on taxation (substituents) and in increases on public spending (substituents), although 
the latter is not significant and the former is statistically significant during 3 quarters; increases 
in taxation result in increases on the FFR (complements) and increases in public spending result 
in decreases on the FFR (complements), where the former is statistically significant during 7 
quarters and the latter is not significant at all; overall, we could say that complementarity 
between policies dominates substitutability; (vi) analysing the causality between public 
spending and taxation, there is evidence in favour of the “tax and spend” view because changes 
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in public spending follow changes in taxation3; nevertheless, there is no clear causality between 
taxation and spending, given that  an increase in taxation is followed by a decrease in public 
spending, which could mean a path towards public finance stability (fiscal retrenchment); 
furthermore, all these results are not statistically significant. 
[Figure 6] 
      Model 3 (results on request): comparing to the 1st model, the unique remarkable change is 
in the case of supply shocks, wherein this model the inflation rate increases, instead of 
decreasing even though the results are not significant; to some extent, there are some 
quantitative changes, but the fundamentals on how policy reacts and its effects on the main 
macroeconomic variables remain unchanged, and so the 1st model is robust to the dummy 
variable introduced to isolate the effects of the crisis. 
      Model 4 (results on request): comparing to the 2nd model, the unique remarkable change is 
in the study of causality between public spending and taxation; in this model, it seems that the 
evidence points for the “spend and tax” view; indeed, and as it is not the main objective of this 
paper, this change may be due to the limited capability of this SVAR model to analyse such 
issue; moreover, the result of absence of clear causality remains valid in this last specification, 
as well as the result of statistically insignificance. 
      Overall, the models remain robust to the periods of the crisis which may indicate that other 
variables which were not included as endogenous in this specification motivated the use of 
unconventional monetary policies in the US. The qualitative results are in line with other studies 
using this approach and with economic theory, e.g. the AS-AD model in the case of supply and 
demand shocks.  
 
3.3.2. The case of EMU 
      To make the models comparable between the US and the EMU, we have run the same 
models in the same specifications and with the same endogenous4 and exogenous variables. 
The only difference is that we have run a model up to 4 lags in both specifications5. The main 
reason for that was the need to satisfy the basic properties of stability, homoscedasticity and 
absence of autocorrelation. Again, usually the normality hypothesis was relatively rejected, but 
the sample period, in this case, is even more limited and so the test has low power. At the same 
                                                          
3 Keep in mind that restriction (iii) in the 2nd specification rules out any impact from spending on taxation in the 
long run. 
4 Check table 2A for the ADF stationarity tests. 
5 Another difference is that both the capb and the EONIA were used in levels, in model 1. Again, it has been 
done to satisfy the basic properties of stability, homoscedasticity and absence of autocorrelation. 
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time, we imposed the same set of restrictions for the EMU and the quantitative interpretations 
done in the case of US remain valid here. Figures 7 and 8 show the impulse response functions 
to fiscal and monetary shocks in model 1, for the EMU. At the same time, figures 9 and 10 
show the impulse response functions to taxes (fiscal) and monetary shocks in model 2, for the 
EMU. Again, for reasons of statistical significance, we neglected the analysis of spending 
shocks in the last two figures and this is available on request. 
      In practice, in this section, we will present the results of each model and settle a comparison 
between the impulse response functions in the EMU and in the US. 
      Model 1: (i) supply shocks (results on request) result in an initial decrease in real output 
,and in an increase afterwards, and in a decrease in inflation (the former result is not statistically 
significant); in terms of policy, fiscal policy becomes restrictive while monetary policy 
becomes expansionary which may suggest the different objectives between the fiscal and 
monetary authorities, i.e., the monetary authority could be viewed as obsessed with inflation 
neglecting the output growth and the fiscal authority just caring with output growth, which is a 
good signal for public finance, neglecting inflation; (ii) demand shocks (results on request) 
result in an increase in both real output and inflation, where the former is statistically significant 
during 4 quarters; in terms of policy, both fiscal and monetary policies become restrictive, 
although the results are not significant at all; (iii) fiscal policy shocks show Keynesian effects, 
i.e., a restrictive fiscal policy is followed by a decrease in real output; an interesting result is 
that inflation reacts positively to a shock in fiscal policy, which might indicate a mechanism 
worth of a further study relating fiscal activity and prices;  
[Figure 7] 
(iv) monetary policy shocks invalidate the view of the traditional interest rate mechanism, i.e., 
an interest rate hike is followed by an increase in real output (non-Keynesian monetary policy), 
and there is a price-puzzle which is common to the SVAR literature, i.e., an interest rate increase 
is followed by an increase in inflation (see Sims, 1992); two other reasons may justify this price-
puzzle which would be either the effectiveness of EONIA to control inflation is reduced or this 
EONIA would be a bad proxy for monetary policy, possibly because after the ZLB period the 
interest rate is not anymore a good proxy for monetary policy measures; (v) in terms of fiscal 
and monetary interactions, the EONIA hardly reacts to the capb, while an increase in the 
EONIA is followed by an increase on the capb, and so there is evidence of complementarity 
between fiscal and monetary policies. 
[Figure 8] 
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      Model 2: (i) supply shocks (results on request) result in an increase on output and a decrease 
on inflation; in terms of policy, both policies become expansionary until the 5th quarter 
(decrease on the interest rate and the increase on public spending is higher than the increase on 
taxation, where the former is not statistically significant) and then they become both restrictive 
(the increase on taxation is higher than the increase on public spending, as well as the EONIA 
starts to increase); (ii) demand shocks (results on request) result in an increase on both real 
output and inflation; in terms of policy, both become restrictive (increase on both taxation and 
interest rate, as well as decrease on public spending); (iii) fiscal policy shocks show Keynesian 
effects in the revenue side on real output, although it is not significant, and non-Keynesian 
effects in the spending side, until the 4th quarter, and then Keynesian effects; one possible reason 
could be that non-Keynesian effects were outweighing Keynesian ones initially (see van Aarle 
and Garretsen, 2003 for a discussion); nevertheless, fiscal policy effects on output growth are 
not statistically significant in this specification;  
[Figure 9] 
(iv) monetary policy shocks invalidate the traditional interest rate mechanism and evidence the 
price puzzle common in the SVAR analysis (statistically significant during 3 quarters in both 
cases); (v) in terms of fiscal and monetary interactions, there is no clear complementarity or 
substitutability between the two policies because fiscal policy act as a complement to monetary 
policy, i.e., interest rate hikes are followed by an increase on taxation and a decrease on public 
spending, and the interest rate act as a substitute to fiscal policy on the public spending side, 
i.e., an increase in public spending is followed by an increase on interest rate; relative to 
taxation, the interest rate act as a substitute until the 4th quarter, although the result is not 
significant, and then as a complement; however, and taking into account the statistical 
significance, we could say that the policies act as complements, given that the statistically 
significant results are the fiscal policy responses to monetary shocks; (vi) analysing the 
causality between public spending and taxation, there is little evidence on the “spend and tax” 
view as taxation increases are following increases on public spending, although the result is not 
statistically significant; furthermore, increases on taxation are followed by decreases on public 
spending; this is a very interesting result, as the fiscal authority is always seeking for sustainable 
budget balances (fiscal retrenchment), which in turn may be influenced by the fiscal rules in 
the Stability and Growth Pact, and because it is statistically significant. 
[Figure 10] 
      Model 3 (results on request): comparing to the 1st model, there are some remarkable 
changes; (i) relative to supply shocks, the real output shows a different path (and it is now 
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statistically significant) and the fiscal policy reacts differently, i.e., in this model the capb reacts 
negatively to these shocks, and so the government will set an expansionary fiscal policy to 
stimulate demand; nevertheless, the fiscal reaction is not statistically significant; monetary 
policy also becomes expansionary, but it only lasts to the 4th quarter; as in the case of fiscal 
policy, also this monetary reaction is not statistically significant; (iii) relative to fiscal policy 
shocks, the real output reacts in an opposite way, i.e., while in model 1 there was evidence of 
Keynesian effects, in model 3 there is evidence of non-Keynesian effects; additionally, that 
‘interesting’ result between fiscal policy and inflation is still positive, but now it is not 
statistically significant; (iv) relative to monetary shocks, the EONIA lost effectiveness in 
controlling both output growth and inflation, which stress out that idea of the interest rate not 
being anymore a good proxy for monetary policy; (v) relative to fiscal and monetary 
interactions, while in model 1 it was the fiscal policy reacting to monetary policy, in model 3 it 
is monetary policy reacting to fiscal policy; however, the evidence of complementarity still 
holds. 
      Model 4 (results on request): comparing to the 2nd model, there are also some remarkable 
changes; (i) relative to supply shocks, while in model 2 fiscal policy was expansionary during 
5 quarters, in model 4 it is always restrictive; (iii) relative to fiscal policy shocks, while in model 
2 there was evidence of Keynesian effects of fiscal adjustments on the revenue side, in model 
4 the opposite is verified, although the results are not much significant; furthermore, model 4 
shows clear non-Keynesian effects of fiscal adjustments on the spending side, while model 2 
only showed it during 4 quarters; however, these results remain statistically insignificant from 
one specification to the other; (vi) in terms of causality between public spending and taxation, 
in model 2 increases on public spending were followed by increases in taxation, while in model 
4 the opposite holds during 4 quarters (fiscal retrenchment, again), and even afterwards these 
variables hardly interact, although these results remain statistically insignificant here. 
      Overall, the qualitative results are in line with other studies using this approach and with 
economic theory, e.g. the AS-AD model in the case of supply and demand shocks. However, 
one could conclude that the inclusion of the dummy variable in the case of EMU changes more 
the results than in the case of US. Particularly in the case of EMU, it faced one more crisis than 
the US, i.e., the sovereign crisis starting in 2010-11, and so the US economy probably recovered 
earlier than the EMU, and measures of unconventional monetary policy were also conducted 
much later than in the case of US. Another important difference is the basis of each economy. 
In practice, a bank-based economy, as the EMU, may react very differently to the financial 
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crisis than a market-based economy, as the US, but it is a discussion outside our plan which we 
leave for future research.  
      The other main differences from the analysis of the impulse response functions may 
resumed in the following way: (i) relative to supply shocks, monetary policy reacts differently 
in the US, i.e., while in the EMU it becomes expansionary, in the US it becomes restrictive; the 
inclusion of the dummy variable affects the reaction of fiscal policy, i.e., while in the EMU it 
becomes expansionary, in the US it remains restrictive; (ii) relative to demand shocks, both the 
policy reactions seem to be relatively the same in both areas; (iii) relative to fiscal policy shocks, 
the Keynesian effects in the US differ relative to the case of EMU essentially in the spending 
side; the inclusion of the dummy variable clearly changes the effects in the EMU, as while in 
the case of US the Keynesian effects of fiscal policy remain unchanged, these turn in non-
Keynesian effects in the EMU (the crises faced by the EMU may change the fundamentals of 
direct effects of fiscal policy on real output, while the crisis faced by the US not); (iv) relative 
to monetary policy shocks, these are clearly different between the two areas, i.e., in the EMU 
case the traditional interest rate mechanism is always rejected and there is evidence on the price-
puzzle result which is common in the SVAR literature whereas in the US case the opposite 
holds; one possible explanation would be the measure used as a proxy for monetary policy in 
the EMU, where the ECB has three reference interest rates, and so a unique interest rate as the 
EONIA could be a bad proxy, whereas the FFR is the unique policy rate used by the Fed; (v) 
relative to fiscal and monetary interactions, it seems that it is fiscal policy reacting to monetary 
policy in the EMU case whereas it is monetary policy reacting to fiscal policy in the US case; 
while in the case of EMU taxation and public spending seem to act as complements to the 
EONIA, and the EONIA seems to act as substitute to the public spending, in the case of US 
they seem to act as substitutes to the FFR, and the FFR seems to act as a complement to both 
taxation and public spending; although there is no clear interaction between the two policies, 
on average they seem to act as complements in both areas; (vi) relative to the causality between 
public spending and taxation, although these variables appear to present the same reaction to 
each other, there is little evidence on the “tax and spend” view in the case of US and on the 
“spend and tax” view in the case of EMU; the inclusion of the dummy variable changes a bit 
the comparison, but it is not too significant. 
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4. Robustness Check 
      Indeed, in the previous section, we performed some robustness check by analysing how the 
model works including the dummy variable (𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) and by separating the fiscal policy in 
spending and revenue sides.  
      The other most common approaches to performing such a robustness check are dividing the 
sample period and analysing how the model works in the two different subsamples, changing 
the order of variables and use other endogenous variables. In our case, the sample periods are 
not high enough to perform the first approach mentioned above, as well as the second one would 
not be feasible since there are 𝑛! possible ordering, with 𝑛 being the number of endogenous 
variables, and if we also did one unique change it would make us to analyse eight different 
models again in a limited space. 
      In fact, what we could perform was the third approach mentioned above and we did it. A 
reasonable alternative endogenous variable we used was the output gap, instead of the real 
output. However, the results did not change significantly so that we stayed with the original 
models and making the analysis on different ones would be counterproductive. 
 
5. Conclusion 
      The discussion about the policy mix has regained importance in the last years due to the 
07-09 crisis. The implementation of UMP may affect this policy mix, but such assessment has 
very limitations (Kozicki et al., 2011).  
      We have applied a SVAR setup to analyse the policy mix in the US and in the EMU. Bearing 
in mind the difficulties of using this methodology for future policy and in the specific case of 
the EMU the mask over heterogeneity across countries, we could find important differences 
between these two major economies, namely on how both fiscal and monetary policies affect 
real output and prices. Overall, both policies act as complements in both areas, even though in 
the EMU the crises may have changed this relationship. In the case of US, the crisis has not 
changed significantly these results and so other variables may have provoked the non-expected 
results of both policies (e.g., other than rational expectations). 
      Comparing to previous studies included in our literature review, the results may have been 
significantly affected due to the crisis, i.e., the inclusion of more recent data changed the 
previous results of policies acting as strategic substituents and of similarity between the cases 
of the US and EMU, given that our evidence suggests that policies are acting as complements 
and there are some differences between these two cases, namely how both fiscal and monetary 
policies affect both real output and inflation. 
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      Indeed, we do not have a large enough amount of observations to evaluate the effect of 
UMP in the policy mix, i.e., to forget about the effect of interest rates on inflation since, say, 
2010. Additionally, “solving” the problems of such assessment mentioned in Kozicki et al. 
(2011) may lead us to better assessing how UMP worked, as well as to analyse whether it is 
temporary or it is going to be part of a new policy toolkit. This is a topic we leave for future 
research.   
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Appendix 
 
Table I.A. Data Sources, Definitions and Transformations (US) 
 
Variable Definition Unit Source 
𝑦 Real GDP Billions of chained 2009 $ FRED 
𝑦∗ Potential GDP Billions of chained 2009 $ FRED 
𝑖 Fed funds rate % FRED 
𝑐𝑝𝑖 Consumer Price Index Index (1982-1984=100) FRED 
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 All Federal Reserve 
Banks: Total Assets 
Millions $ FRED 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 Current interest 
payments 
Billions $ FRED 
𝐺 Current total government 
spending 
Billions $ FRED 
𝑇 Current government tax 
revenues 
Billions $ FRED 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Debt ratio % of GDP FRED 
𝑓𝑠𝑖 Financial Stress Index Index (0=normal 
conditions) 
FRED 
𝑐𝑎𝑏 Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance 
Billions $ IMF, WEO (October 2013 and 
April 2017) * 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 Cyclically Adjusted 
Primary Balance 
% of potential GDP 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 =
𝑐𝑎𝑏
𝑦∗
+
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑦∗
 
𝜋 Inflation rate % 𝜋 = log(𝑐𝑝𝑖 ) − log (𝑐𝑝𝑖 ) 
𝑔 Real government 
spending 
Billions $ 
𝑔 =
𝐺 ∗ 100
𝑐𝑝𝑖
 
𝑡 Real government tax 
revenues 
Billions $ 
𝑡 =
𝑇 ∗ 100
𝑐𝑝𝑖
 
∆𝑦 Real output growth % ∆𝑦 = log(𝑦 ) − log(𝑦 ) 
∆𝑔 Real government 
spending growth 
% ∆𝑔 = log(𝑔 ) − log(𝑔 ) 
∆𝑡 Real government tax 
revenues growth 
% ∆𝑡 = log(𝑡 ) − log (𝑡 ) 
𝑔𝑎𝑝 Output gap % of potential GDP 
𝑔𝑎𝑝 =
𝑦 − 𝑦∗
𝑦∗
 
* These data were only available on an annual basis. We computed their quarterly averages by using the quadratic 
function in EViews. 
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Table I.B. Data Sources, Definitions and Transformations (EMU) 
Variable Definition Unit Source 
𝑌 Nominal GDP Millions € AMECO * 
𝑖 EONIA % Eurostat 
𝑐𝑝𝑖 Consumer Price Index Index (2010=100) OECD 
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ECB assets Millions € FRED 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 Current interest 
payments 
Millions € AMECO * 
𝐺 Current total government 
spending 
Millions € AMECO * 
𝑇 Current tax burden Millions € AMECO * 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 Debt ratio % of GDP ECB 
𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠 Composite Indicator of 
Systemic Stress (GDP 
weights) 
Index (O=normal 
conditions) 
ECB** 
𝑐𝑎𝑏 Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance 
% of potential GDP IMF, WEO (April 2017) * 
𝑔𝑎𝑝 Output gap % of potential GDP IMF, WEO (April 2017) * 
𝑦 Real GDP Millions € 
𝑦 =
𝑌 ∗ 100
𝑐𝑝𝑖
 
𝑦∗ Potential GDP Millions € 𝑦∗ = 𝑌 ∗ (1 + 𝑔𝑎𝑝) 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 Cyclically Adjusted 
Primary Balance 
% 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 = 𝑐𝑎𝑏 +
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑦∗
 
𝜋 Inflation % 𝜋 = log(𝑐𝑝𝑖 ) − log (𝑐𝑝𝑖 ) 
𝑔 Real government 
spending 
Millions € 
𝑔 =
𝐺 ∗ 100
𝑐𝑝𝑖
 
𝑡 Real government taxes Millions € 
𝑡 =
𝑇 ∗ 100
𝑐𝑝𝑖
 
∆𝑦 Real GDP growth % ∆𝑦 = log(𝑦 ) − log (𝑦 ) 
∆𝑔 Real government 
spending growth 
% ∆𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔 ) − log (𝑔 ) 
∆𝑡 Real government taxes 
growth  
% ∆𝑡 = log(𝑡 ) − log (𝑡 ) 
* These data were only available on an annual basis. We computed their quarterly averages by using the quadratic 
function in EViews. 
** These data were only available on a weekly basis. We computed its quarterly averages in EViews. 
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Table II. Formal Specifications for the Estimated Models 
Specification Vector of Endogenous var Vector of Exogenous var 
Model 1 𝑌 = (∆𝑦 , ∆𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 , ∆𝑖 , 𝜋 ) 𝑋 = (∆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) 
Model 2 𝑌 = (∆𝑦 , ∆𝑡 , ∆𝑔 , ∆𝑖 , 𝜋 ) 𝑋 = (∆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) 
Model 3 𝑌 = (∆𝑦 , ∆𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 , ∆𝑖 , 𝜋 ) 𝑋 = (∆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ) 
Model 4 𝑌 = (∆𝑦 , ∆𝑡 , ∆𝑔 , ∆𝑖 , 𝜋 ) 𝑋 = (∆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ) 
 
 
Table III. Unit Root Tests 
 US EMU 
𝑦 -0.52 -1.45 
∆𝑦 -4.49*** -3.57*** 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 -1.70 -2.74* 
∆𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏 -3.95** -11.06*** 
𝑡 -1.52 -1.22 
∆𝑡 -4.91*** -4.28*** 
𝑔 -0.75 -0.45 
∆𝑔 -2.85* -3.83*** 
𝑖 -2.65* -2.43 
∆𝑖 -4.45*** -4.85*** 
𝜋 -7.66*** -3.11** 
𝑔𝑎𝑝 -2.83* -2.02 
∆𝑔𝑎𝑝 -7.15*** -3.06** 
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.24 -0.27 
∆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 -6.53*** -5.12*** 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF) containing a constant and up to 12 lags in its specification (Schwarz Info 
Criterion) on stationarity, where *, **, *** denotes that the null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root is 
rejected at 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively 
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Figure 1. US relevant figures 
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Figure 2. EMU relevant figures 
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Figure 3. Estimated IRFs to a fiscal shock from model 1 (US) 
  
  
Shock2: capb shock 
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Figure 4. Estimated IRFs to a monetary shock from model 1 (US) 
  
  
 
Shock3: ffr shock 
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Figure 5. Estimated IRFs to a real government taxes shock from model 2 (US) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Shock2: real government taxes shock 
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Figure 6. Estimated IRFs to a monetary shock from model 2 (US) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            Shock4: ffr shock 
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Figure 7. Estimated IRFs to a fiscal shock from model 1 (EMU) 
  
  
 
Shock2: capb shock 
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Figure 8. Estimated IRFs to a monetary shock from model 1 (EMU) 
  
  
Shock3: eonia shock 
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Figure 9. Estimated IRFs to a real government taxes shock from model 2 (EMU) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shock2: real government taxes shock 
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Figure 10. Estimated IRFs to a monetary shock from model 2 (EMU) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shock4: eonia shock 
 
 
 
